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GARY J. SIMSONt
Based on the title of Stephen Carter's latest book, The Confirma-
tion Mess: Cleaning Up the Federal Appointments Process,' one might
suppose that Carter thinks that the federal appointment process is
in need of major structural reform. As Carter makes clear in the
final pages of the book, however, he actually thinks that the process
is basically sound.2 Although he is quite distressed about the nasty
battles that sometimes take place over confirming nominees-what
he frequently calls the "blood on the floor"s-he sees no need to
change anything structural in order to clean up this messy process.
In his view, people's attitudes are all that need to be changed.
If taken to heart by Senators and others in a position to initiate
serious reform, The Confirmation Mess could make a bad situation
even worse. Focusing on the Supreme Court appointment process,
I will argue that Carter's approach to that process is fundamentally
flawed.
Although The Confirmation Mess includes within its scope the
broad range of appointments covered by the Constitution's
Appointments Clause,4 I discuss only its implications for the
Supreme Court appointment process for two reasons. First, that
process is rather clearly the book's central concern, with much of
what Carter has to say being expressly addressed to the nature of
t William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Yale University.
t Professor of Law, Cornell University. B.A. 1971,J.D. 1974, Yale University. I
am grateful to Kathy Abrams,Jessie Beeber, Bob Green, David Lyons, and Rosalind
Simson for many helpful comments.
1 STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL
APPOINTMENTS PROcEss (1994) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
2 See pp. 203-06.
s See, e.g., pp. 24, 95, 187, 206.
4 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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the Court and how its members should be chosen. Second, unlike
Carter, I believe that the appointment of Supreme CourtJustices is
sufficiently different in its implications from other types of appoint-
ments-particularly nonjudicial ones-that it is generally unhelpful
to try to discuss them in the same breath. In my view, the national
importance of the issues decided by the Court, the final and
nationwide effect of the Court's decisions, and the Constitution's
virtual guarantee of life tenure to the Justices5 combine to make the
Supreme Court appointment process one most usefully discussed
alone.
I. A SYNOPSIS
The Confirmation Mess is not, to say the least, a tightly argued
book. In the preface, Carter describes the book as "in the nature of
an extended essay, remarking on general themes by using familiar
examples."6 He then proceeds to implement this style by setting
forth his arguments in a distinctly nonlinear way. Arguments are
begun, dropped in midstream in favor of lengthy anecdotes or
asides, and resumed pages or even chapters later, often with little
attention to just where they left off.
Whatever the merits of this mode of argument, one obvious
consequence is that it shifts to Carter's would-be critics the burden
of setting forth with some clarity the arguments that Carter appears
to make. Before explaining why I find The Confirmation Mess so
troubling, I therefore will try to reconstruct what Carter has to say
about the Supreme Court appointment process as fairly and
cohesively as I can.
According to Carter, the Supreme Court appointment process
will continue to invite "blood on the floor" unless people change
their thinking in four principal ways. First and foremost, people
must stop thinking about how the nominee, if confirmed, would be
apt to vote on issues likely to come before the Court.7 People's
preoccupation with nominees' likely votes is largely to blame for the
5 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § I ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour ...
6 P. xi.
' Chapters three through five are devoted primarily to this argument, but the
argument is spread virtually across the entirety of the book. In analyzing this
argument in Part III, I will expand upon this synopsis of the argument and refer more
specifically to relevant passages in the book. In Parts IV and V, I will do the same
with regard to the second and third arguments described in this synopsis.
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end-justifies-the-means approach often taken to ensure the defeat
of a disfavored nominee. Moreover, a nominee's likely votes are no
one's business but the nominee's. For people in general, and the
President and Senators in particular, to assign importance to a
nominee's likely votes is antithetical to the judicial independence
that is an essential part of a Supreme Court Justice's role. In
exercising their power ofjudicial review, the Justices must be willing
to resist the majority will out of regard for constitutional pro-
tections often crafted with racial, religious, and other types of
minorities foremost in mind. Yet the likelihood that the Justices
will be willing to bear this burden is greatly diminished if the
process for appointing them invites the public and the public's
elected representatives in the White House and Senate to pass
judgment on the acceptability of their likely votes.
Second, people need to develop a more realistic and less
grandiose conception of the Court.' People's willingness to engage
in mean-spirited, no-holds-barred efforts to keep a nominee off the
Court is based in part on a misconception of the Court's impor-
tance. People who really want to make things happen would be wise
in all respects to stop expending so much energy trying to block the
appointments of Supreme Court nominees whom they fear will vote
the "wrong" way. Instead, they should channel their energies into
the democratic process, taking more time to persuade their fellow
citizens of the need for change and availing themselves more fully
of other political means of effecting change.
Third, people should become more forgiving of nominees'
moral lapses and think more seriously about whether the nominee
is truly sorry for any regrettable behavior that has come to light.9
The existing confirmation mess, with all its blood on the floor, is
partly made possible by a widespread self-righteousness that seems
to revel in catching aspirants to high public office in error. Rather
than try to place a nominee's past misconduct in perspective, people
are only too happy to magnify its importance and seize upon it as
a ground for disqualification. This attitude flies in the face of
Christian theology, which teaches that any of us is always susceptible
to falling into sin. In keeping with the Christian model, people
should approach nominees' moral lapses with compassion, not
venom, and be ready to extend forgiveness to those who show
'This argument appears in the book primarily on pp. 95, 204-06.
9 Carter principally makes this argument on pp. x, 28-31, 144, 183-86.
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genuine contrition.
Fourth and lastly, Senators should abandon the "fantastic
notion""° that Supreme Court nominees deserve a presumption in
favor of confirmation." Senators should recognize that it is
entirely appropriate for them to vote against a nominee not only
because of some glaring flaw, but simply because the nominee does
not seem sufficiently likely to do a first-rate job. If Senators
adopted this view, it would greatly help reduce the blood on the
floor, because opponents of a nomination would not need to claim
some horrible defect in the nominee in order to prevail.
Absent major structural reform, I seriously doubt that telling
Senators not to give Supreme Court nominees a presumption in
favor of confirmation is apt to do much to reduce the "blood on the
floor." I also see nothing "fantastic" in the fact that nominees are
regularly given such a presumption. It is a function of certain
realities discussed below. 2 I see no need, however, to pursue here
my differences with Carter regarding this proposal, because, as
indicated elsewhere, I believe that a recommendation to abandon a
presumption for confirmation is defensible for reasons other than
those that Carter sets forth. 3 My disagreements with Carter with
regard to his other prescriptions for change are far more deep-
rooted, and I will devote my attention to them instead. In Parts II
through V, I will attempt to show that all three of Carter's other
proposals are unsound. I begin by suggesting in Part II that the
problem that prompts Carter to make these proposals-the potential
for "blood on the floor"-does not warrant the amount of attention
that he gives it.
10 P. 159.
" I hesitate to some extent to list this argument as one of Carter's major points.
After briefly articulating the argument, see p. 159, Carter immediately swings into a
20-page discussion in which he purports to "divide potentially disqualifying factors
into five categories and to explain, in each case, why the concern is serious and what
it should take to cure the problem." P. 160. Basically, if Carter is really eager to
persuade Senators to stop approaching confirmation decisions with a presumption in
favor of confirmation, this elaborate discussion and grading of disqualifying factors
is difficult to understand. It seems to focus Senators' attention on whether a
nominee is sufficiently tarnished to justify their voting against confirmation, rather
than sufficiently highly qualified to merit their voting "yes."
'2 See infra part II.B.
'5 See GaryJ. Simson, Thomas's Supreme Unfitness-A Letter to the Senate on Advise
and Consent, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 619, 651-53 (1993).
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II. BLOOD ON THE FLOOR
Throughout The Confirmation Mess, Carter invokes the image of
"blood on the floor"14 and treats the elimination of this unpalat-
able sight as the ultimate good to which people concerned about the
Supreme Court appointment process can aspire.1 5  Although
Carter deserves credit for a strategically astute choice of imag-
ery-after all, it is pretty hard for anyone to be in favor of something
like blood on the floor-his preoccupation with the reality that it
represents seems misguided. I question in section A whether the
potential for nasty fights over confirming nominees is nearly as
serious a problem as Carter suggests. Even more basically, I
question in section B whether it is nearly as serious a problem as
one that Carter virtually ignores.
A. Magnitude of the Problem
In treating the potential for "blood on the floor" as the central
problem plaguing the Supreme Court appointment process, Carter
expressly or implicitly makes the following assumptions: in light of
recent experience, people nominated to the Supreme Court in the
foreseeable future bear a serious risk of being subjected to vicious
and genuinely irresponsible attacks; it is very unfair to nominees to
force them to fend off various untrue allegations if they wish to
secure an appointment to the Court; and if the Supreme Court
appointment process continues to be as bloody as it has been in
recent years, it will soon become impossible to find top quality
people willing to accept a nomination to the Court. I suggest below
that none of these assumptions is well-founded.
1. Probability of Nasty Attacks
In lamenting the potential for "blood on the floor," Carter
repeatedly points to Robert Bork as an example of a nominee who
was subjected to an array of mean and reprehensible attacks.
1 6
Even assuming, for purposes of argument, that those Senators and
others who led the opposition to Bork treated him very badly-and
I do have some doubts on that score-I question whether Carter is
not reading more into the Bork episode than it deserves.
14 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
15 See, e.g., pp. 22, 188, 191, 206.
16 See pp. 45-52, 120-21, 124-33.
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First, as I will discuss in Part III,17 President Reagan's decision
to nominate Bork was exceptionally provocative. If the response to
it was indeed quite extreme, that hardly implies that the typical
nomination should be expected to arouse a highly problematic
response.
Second, the way that other recent Supreme Court nominees
have been treated offers future nominees little reason to anticipate
a barrage of nasty attacks. Most obviously, when Presidents in
recent years have put forth nominees with the intent of minimizing
controversy and drawing broad Senate support from the start, there
has rarely been a drop of blood on the floor to be found. Indeed,
President Clinton's nominations of "consensus candidates" Ruth
Bader Ginsburg18 and Stephen Breyer 19 were followed by confir-
mation processes so tame as to be downright boring.
Even when Presidents recently have selected relatively controver-
sial nominees, the process typically has been quite deferential to the
nominee. Though obviously quite a bit more conservative in his
leanings than a majority of the Senate would have preferred,"
Reagan nominee Antonin Scalia sailed through his confirmation
hearings virtually untouched. His repeated refusals to answer
questions that might shed light on his likely votes on the
Court21-perhaps most eye-opening was his refusal to comment
even on the validity of the holding in Marbury v. Madison22-were
" See infra text accompanying notes 74-79.
'8 See Linda Greenhouse, The Ginsburg Hearings: An Absence of Suspense Is Wel-
comed, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1993, § 4, at 3.
" See Linda Greenhouse, Why Breyer's Hearing Was Meant to Be Dull, N.Y. TIMES,
July 17, 1994, § 4, at 4.
21 See David A. Kaplan, Scalia Was "Worse" than Bork, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1987,
at A23.
21 See William G. Ross, The Questioning of Supreme Court Nominees at Senate
Confirmation Hearings: Proposals for Accommodating the Needs of the Senate and
Ameliorating the Fears of the Nominees, 62 TuL. L. REV. 109, 138-39, 162 (1987)
(discussing Scalia's refusal to answer questions about prior Supreme Court decisions
and various constitutional issues).
The nominee stated:
As I say, Marbuiy v. Madison [5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)] is one of
the pillars of the Constitution. To the extent that you think a nominee
would be so foolish, or so extreme as to kick over one of the pillars of the
Constitution, I suppose you should not confirm him. But I do not think I
should answer questions regarding any specific Supreme Court opinion,
even one as fundamental as Marbuty v. Madison.
Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on theJudiciaty, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
33 (1986).
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rewarded by the Senate with a unanimous affirmative confirmation
vote. Similarly, despite a track record on constitutional issues so
meager as to give rise to fears that he might be a closet Bork,
25
Bush nominee David Souter encountered little resistance in his
ascension to the Court. Prior to his confirmation hearings, some
members of the Senate Judiciary Committee publicly urged the
importance of pressing the nominee for his views.24 Yet in the
hearings themselves, the committee members treated this so-called
"stealth candidate" 25 with the utmost cordiality and generally were
quick to seize on any indications in his testimony that he was not
another Bork after all.
26
The only nominee of late whose confirmation process compared
in fireworks to Bork's was Clarence Thomas, but even Thomas's
confirmation process does not give future nominees much cause to
fear irresponsible attacks. As I have tried to show in an article on
the Thomas appointment,27 although this Bush nominee surely was
subjected to strong attacks inside and outside the hearing room,
those attacks generally were not irresponsible but highly deserved.
Indeed, the attacks made inside the hearing room ought to have
been considerably more intense.
28
2. Unfairness to Nominees
Although Carter complains most explicitly about mean and
vicious attacks on nominees, it appears at times that his concern
about "blood on the floor" extends beyond such attacks. 29 At the
heart of his concern seems to be some sense that it is very unfair to
' See Steven A. Holmes, A Window to Souter's Way of Life, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15,
1990, at A25; Neil A. Lewis, Souter's Views Trouble Groups Opposed to Bork, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 7, 1990, at A14.
2" See Richard A. Berke, Senators Expect Assent on Souter, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1990,
at A18.
' The press was enamored of the label. See, e.g., David G. Savage, Abortion Brief
Tells Little ofSouter, L.A. TIMES,July 31, 1990, at A14; Tim Smart, Souter's Opponents
Still Don't Have Him in Their Sights, Bus. WK., Sept. 17, 1990, at 34.
21 See Linda Greenhouse, DefiningSouter, Some, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1990, at Al;
Linda Greenhouse, The "Not Bork" Test, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1990, at A18.27 See Simson, supra note 13, at 619-45.
21 See, e.g., Walter Goodman, Clear Picture of White Power and Black Achievement,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1991, at A22 ("In their questions to the nominee [in the hearings
on Anita Hill's allegations], the Democrats tiptoed around him as if he were an
undetonated mine.").
' See, e.g., pp. 5, 21-22.
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nominees to make them fight off untrue allegations, even if those
allegations are not made recklessly or with malicious intent.
Although I agree with Carter that vicious attacks aimed at
distorting the truth are grossly unfair to nominees and have no
place in the system, I part ways with him to the extent that he
worries about the fairness of subjecting nominees to attacks that
may ultimately prove unpersuasive but that are neither malicious
nor reckless. Nominees for the Supreme Court seem no less able
to take care of themselves than the wide variety of public officials
who, in the interest of the "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"
30
debate contemplated by the First Amendment, are obliged to fend
off a broad range of defamatory falsehoods."1 The confirmation
process is the public's and Senate's one opportunity to find out who
this person is who is about to be given a lifetime seat on the
nation's highest court. Under the circumstances, there seems to be
good reason to err in favor of vigorous debate, even though it may
prove "vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp."
32
If potential nominees feel that such rough-and-tumble scrutiny is
unfair, they are entirely free to protect themselves from it by
withdrawing their names from consideration.
3. Quality Control
Carter raises the specter that, if the appointment process stays
as bloody as it has been in recent years, good candidates for the
Court may begin to withdraw their names from consideration with
great frequency and Presidents will be forced to lower their
standards significantly to get people willing to be nominees.
33 I
seriously doubt that there is any substance to this claim.
As discussed above,34 the process does not seem to be nearly
as bloody as Carter assumes. Furthermore, even assuming that the
process is somewhat bloodier than I have suggested, the possibility
of a lifetime seat on the nation's highest court is a powerful
incentive to people asked to be nominees to let the process go
forward and endure whatever unpleasantness it may offer. As
s New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
Si See id. at 279-80 (holding that public officials may not recover damages for
defamatory falsehoods relating to their official conduct unless they can show that the
statements were knowingly false or made with reckless disregard for the truth).2 Id. at 270.
" See pp. x, 5.
s' See supra part II.A.1.
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Douglas Ginsburg demonstrated when he agreed to a nomination
that President Reagan ultimately felt compelled to withdraw,35 even
nominees with something to hide are apt to find a seat on the Court
sufficiently tempting to take their chances with the process. Finally,
even if the nature of the process leads some people to decline
nomination, the pool of people both very willing and able to serve
on the Court seems sufficiently large to be in no real danger of
being exhausted any time soon. Perhaps I am too easily impressed
by people or not impressed enough by what it takes to do a good
job on the Court, but I think our nation's courts, the bar, govern-
ment, and academia offer a wealth of excellent candidates from
which to choose.
B. The Real Confirmation Mess
Even assuming, for purposes of argument, that "blood on the
floor" is somewhat more of a problem than I claim, I cannot
imagine that it is even roughly comparable in seriousness to a
problem that Carter all but ignores: presidential domination of the
appointment process. Carter mentions this problem only once and
then only in passing as a theoretical possibility. 6 To borrow
Carter's sanguinary imagery for a moment, Carter is so preoccupied
with cleaning up the blood on the floor that he hasn't bothered to
notice that the patient is dying.
As I have argued at length elsewhere,37 the appointment of
Clarence Thomas vividly demonstrated that the President's powers
of persuasion have become so formidable that, at least for a fairly
popular President, the President's power to nominate is now not
much less than a power to appoint.3" In light of the available
evidence about Thomas at the time that he was confirmed, many of
the fifty-two Senators who voted to confirm him must have had
grave doubts about his fitness for a seat on the nation's highest
court. There were various reasons to question seriously not only his
" See Nina Totenberg, The Confirmation Process and the Public: To Know or Not to
Know, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1213, 1224-25 (1988) (discussing the withdrawal of the
Ginsburg nomination after press reports that the nominee had used marijuana while
a law professor).
s See pp. 13-14.
s See Simson, supra note 13, at 619-49.
For discussion of presidential power and the various means of presidential
persuasion, see GEORGE C. EDWARDS, III, PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE IN CONGRESS
(1980); BARBARA KELLERMAN, THE POLITICAL PRESIDENCY (1984); RICHARD E.
NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS (rev. ed. 1990).
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integrity but his legal abilities as well. 9 By all indications, howev-
er, most, if not almost all, of the Senators who voted for Thomas
put aside their doubts about his fitness out of concern for their
political futures if they went against the wishes of George Bush.40
A very popular President at the time-how quickly things
change!-Bush had made clear to the public via the press and to
individual Senators by more private means of communication that
this was a nomination that he urgently wished to see succeed.4 1
Thomas's confirmation in the face of compelling reasons to vote
him down was hardly an aberration. On the contrary, it simply
demonstrated how far an obvious and unfortunate trend had gone.
As evidenced by the difference in rejection rates for Supreme Court
nominees before and after 1900, the history of appointments to the
Court in this century is one of unprecedented presidential domina-
tion of the process. Since 1900, the Senate has rejected only about
one Supreme Court nomination out of ten.42 Before 1900, the
rejection rate was much higher-roughly one out of four.
43
Most obviously, Thomas's appointment illustrated how the
current system of presidential domination fails to provide enough
protection against Supreme Court appointments that are not in the
nation's best interests. Too much depends on the President's
dedication to the common good. Thomas's appointment also
illustrated how the current system jeopardizes the Supreme Court's
independence. Presidents are so able to put people to their
ideological liking on the Court that the line separating the executive
and judicial branches can become dangerously blurred.
" See Simson, supra note 13, at 620-45.
40 See id. at 645-48.
41 See Andrew Rosenthal, Bush Emphasizes He Backs Thomas in Spite of Uproar, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 1991, at Al; Andrew Rosenthal, Thomas's Edge Steady, Vote Due Today,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1991, at Al.
42 See Gary J. Simson, Taking the Court Seriously: A Proposed Approach to Senate
Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY 283,323 n.139 (1990)
(counting six rejections out of 58 nominations from 1900 to 1989). All four
nominations since 1990 have gone through, meaning that in this century six
nominations have been rejected out of 62. In calculating the rejection rate, I follow
the standard practice of counting as rejections any nominations that are either voted
down by the Senate, withdrawn by the President, or not acted on by the Senate. See,
e.g., JOSEPH P. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 302-03 (1953);
Robert B. McKay, Selection of United States Supreme Court Justices, 9 U. KAN. L. REV.
109, 130 (1960).
4s See Simson, supra note 42, at 324 n.143 (counting 20 rejections out of 83
nominations before 1900).
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If the current system is indeed untenable and needs to be
replaced with one in which the President and Senate once again
have roughly equal say, major structural reform is overdue. I have
argued elsewhere that the following reforms would be in order:
The proportion of votes necessary for confirmation to the Court
should be changed by constitutional amendment from half of the
Senate to two-thirds." Unless and until such an amendment is
adopted, the Senate should adopt a rule that it cannot act on a
Supreme Court nomination unless two-thirds of the SenateJudiciary
Committee votes to approve the nominee.45 The Senate Judiciary
Committee should stop asking Supreme Court nominees about their
views on issues likely to come before the Court and rely instead, for
insight into their views, on their prenomination speeches and
writings and expert analysis of those speeches and writings.46 The
Senators on the Judiciary Committee should step aside during
Supreme Court confirmation hearings and turn over the questioning
to lawyers with substantially greater expertise than the ordinary
Senator in constitutional law, superior cross-examination skills, and
fewer political inhibitions about asking tough questions that need
to be asked.4"
Seemingly transfixed by the "blood on the floor" but satisfied
that it can be cleaned up by other means, Carter declares that there
is no need for major structural reform. Indeed, at the close of the
book, he invokes the "old saw" that "[i]f it ain't broke, . . . don't
"See Simson, supra note 13, at 649-51. Carter discusses the possibility of such an
amendment and comes close to advocating its adoption. See pp. 196-98. Ultimately,
however, he appears to retreat from doing so. See p. 198 (alluding to "[t]hose most
likely to oppose the two-thirds requirement (other than such curmudgeons as I, who
worry about whether we should ever amend the Constitution)"); p. 206 ("If it ain't
broke, runs the old saw, don't fix it ... [and] our processes for nominating and
confirming Supreme CourtJustices and other public officials are not really broken
See Simson, supra note 13, at 651.
46 See id. at 653-56. In light of Carter's claim that Senators should not assign
importance to nominees' likely votes, one might have expected that he would propose
significant limits on the proper scope of questioning. He does not do so, however,
apparently out of concern that such a change in settled practice might prove
disruptive. See pp. 193-94 (rejecting a proposal that nominees not testify, because "at
this point in our history, this change would cause more problems than it would solve
.... [Tihe people of the United States understandably want what passes for
exposure (bits and pieces on the television news) to the individuals who might be
wielding [the Court's] power").
47See Simson, supra note 13, at 656-58.
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fix it" 4" and assures us that "despite all the worry about blood on
the floor and smears and sound bites, our processes for nominating
and confirming Supreme Court Justices and other public officials
are not really broken."49 So doing, he lends legitimacy to, and
helps perpetuate, a fundamentally unsound status quo.50
III. CONSIDERATION OF NOMINEES' LIKELY VOTES
Over the years there has been lively debate as to whether the
President alone may legitimately give weight to how someone is apt
to vote on important issues if appointed to the Court or whether
Senators legitimately may do so as well.5 ' Carter takes the rather
distinctive position that neither the Senate nor the President has any
business thinking about a possible or actual52 nominee's likely
votes.5" In doing so, he maintains that consideration of nominees'
likely votes is inconsistent with judicial independence and much to
blame for all the "blood on the floor." After briefly setting forth
two arguments in favor of presidential and senatorial consideration
of nominees' likely votes, I will suggest that Carter's two objections
to considering likely votes do not cast serious doubt on either the
logic or legitimacy of doing so.
"' P. 206 (italics omitted).
49 id.
o The timing of Carter's contribution to maintaining the status quo perhaps could
not be worse. See GaryJ. Simson, Better Way to Choose Supremes, NAT'L LJ., Mar. 21,
1994, at A19 (suggesting that President Clinton's generally nonconfrontational
approach to appointments makes it substantially easier than usual for Senators to vote
to adopt reforms designed to redress the imbalance of power between the President
and Senate in the Supreme Court appointment process).
51 For commentary urging the former point of view, see Bruce Fein, A Circum-
scribed Senate Confirmation Role, 102 HARv. L. REV. 672 (1989); Richard D. Friedman,
Tribal Myths: Ideology and the Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominations, 95 YALE LJ.
1283 (1986); A. Mitchell McConnell, Jr., Haynsworth and Carswell: A New Senate
Standard of Excellence, 59 KY. LJ. 7 (1970). For commentary arguing the latter
position, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT (1985); Charles
L. Black,Jr., A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees, 79 YALE L.J.
657 (1970); Simson, supra note 42.
512 This qualification, "possible or actual," should be understood as implicit in the
discussion below when I refer to "nominee" or "nominees," unless it is clear from
context that I am referring only to actual nominees.
" Carter probably states his position most clearly on pp. 146-47.
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A. The Case for Considering Likely Votes
1. An Appointment Decision's Likely Effects
The outcomes of cases decided by the Court cannot help but
turn significantly on who is sitting on the Court. As Justice
O'Connor once remarked, the Court's business basically consists of
issues about which one can "write persuasively on either side."
5 4
Moreover, the Justices' different decisions as to which side of the
issue to take is significantly influenced by their different political
and social philosophies and attitudes about the role of courts.5 5
Under the circumstances, it would seem only natural and logical
for the President and Senate-the people who determine the
composition of the Court-to try to put individuals on the Court
who, in their view, would have a very positive influence on the
outcome of cases of substantial national importance. In short, the
President in selecting a nominee would give serious thought to how
the nominee would be apt to vote, and the Senate in deciding
whether to confirm the nominee would give the matter serious
attention as well.56
Of course, the President and Senate would only sensibly also
want to consider other important implications of whatever appoint-
ment they might make. In particular, they almost certainly would
want to think carefully about an appointment's probable effect on
both public confidence in the Court and the fairness and efficiency
of the Court's decision-making process.5" In addition, in deciding
how much weight to give to a nominee's likely votes, the President
and Senate logically would want to discount for the uncertainties of
predicting what issues of major importance are apt to arise during
the nominee's years on the Court and how the nominee would be
I In Search of the Constitution: Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (PBS television
broadcast, July 1987) (interview by Bill Moyers). To similar effect, see Frederick
SchauerJudging in a Corner of the Law, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1717, 1725-29 (1988).
55 See CHARLEs L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 161-66 (1960);
Schauer, supra note 54, at 1729-31.
"See Simson, supra note 42, at 289. As to how such consideration might proceed,
see id. at 290-96.
17 See id. at 289-90. For detailed discussion of these two factors, see id. at 296-300.
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apt to vote on them.5" All in all, however, a President and Senate
intent on making a sound appointment decision would seem obliged
to give a nominee's likely votes on issues of substantial national
significance an important place in their decision.
59
2. The Countermajoritarian Difficulty
Attention to what Alexander Bickel called the "counter-majori-
tarian difficulty"60 also militates in favor of presidential and
senatorial consideration of nominees' likely votes. In a democratic
society, important questions of legitimacy and stability arise when
the Court-a group of unelected, essentially life-tenured judges-
invalidates acts of the people's elected representatives that enjoy
strong popular support.6  If the President and Senate-officials
chosen by, and directly accountable to, the people-give substantial
weight in appointment decisions to nominees' likely votes, the
likelihood of a serious disparity between the will of the majority and
the way in which the Court generally exercises its judicial review
authority is significantly reduced.
6 2
This argument does not assume that Presidents and Senators are
expected to decide who to put on the Court based on who seems
most likely to reach results agreeable to a majority of the people.
As discussed below,63 presidential or senatorial reliance on such a
criterion is difficult to defend. Rather, the argument only assumes
that because the President and Senate are elected by the people and
accountable to the people at the polls for their judicial appoint-
ments, they generally would be slow to appoint individuals to the
Court who typically would exercise their judicial review authority in
a way that varies dramatically from the wishes of the majority.'
5 See id. at 290, 294-95; see also id. at 304-05 (discussing the significance of the
ideological balance of the Court to the weight to be assigned to a nominee's likely
votes).
5' For further discussion of the weight to be assigned to this factor relative to
others, see id. at 300-06.
60 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962).
61 See id. at 16-23.
62 See Robert A. Dahl, Decision.Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
National Policy-Maker, 6J. PUB. L. 279, 283-86 (1957);J. Skelly Wright, The Role of the
Supreme Court in a Democratic Society-Judicial Activism or Restraint?, 54 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 9-11 (1968).
63 See infra part III.B.1.
" On the importance in this regard of presidential and senatorial consideration
of nominees' likely votes, see Simson, supra note 42, at 314-15.
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B. Carter's Case Against Considering Likely Votes
In arguing against considering nominees' likely votes, Carter
rests upon two arguments as to why such consideration is harmful.
Before turning to these arguments, I underline that Carter fails to
grapple with either of the arguments outlined above regarding the
benefits of considering likely votes. He proceeds seemingly
oblivious to the countermajoritarian difficulty. "Why in the world
should anyone who believes in the Constitution," Carter rhetorically
asks, "believe that elected officials should try to check the
Court?""5 In addition, he basically ignores the logic of allowing the
President and Senate to consider in advance one of the most
important effects that their appointments decisions will have.
1. Judicial Independence
According to Carter, the consideration of nominees' likely votes
is at odds with the Court's role of standing firm against the will of
the majority when constitutional principles so demand. As Carter
sees it, the consideration of nominees' likely votes gives rise to a
"worrisome paradox":"5
On the one hand, the courts exist at least-in part to limit majority
sway. On the other hand, the courts are to be peopled with judges
selected at least in part because their constitutional judgments are
consistent with those of the very majority whose authority they
supposedly limit.67
The source of this "paradox," however, is not the consideration of
nominees' likely votes. Instead, it is a dubious assumption that
Carter makes about the form that such consideration would take.
Carter tacitly assumes that, in considering nominees' likely
votes, the President and Senate necessarily would look for nominees
who would be apt to vote on constitutional issues in the way that the
majority of the electorate would prefer. If most people dislike the
restraints on government that a particular constitutional provision
has been interpreted to impose, then, under Carter's thinking, a
President and Senate attentive to nominees' likely votes would be
sure to screen for nominees who would read the provision to
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Carter's thinking, a President and Senate mindful of nominees'
likely votes could be expected to seek out nominees who would
essentially read provisions out of the Constitution if doing so would
reflect the majority will.
In the past, some Presidents and Senators may well have taken
nominees' likely votes into account in the way that Carter assumes.
I am confident, however, that many have deviated quite substantially
from this referendum-style approach."8 Moreover, I am even more
confident that, in keeping with their constitutional duties, Presi-
dents and Senators should be expected to reject such an approach.
The Constitution was intended to provide guidance not only to
the courts, but to the executive and legislative branches as well.6 9
This seems apparent from particular provisions, such as the First
Amendment,"0 that are specifically addressed to the Congress or
President. It is also the only sensible reading of the oath-of-office
provision, which requires the President and members of Congress,
no less than the judiciary, to take an oath to "support the Constitu-
tion." 1 At a minimum, this provision would seem to demand that,
in exercising the authority of their offices, the people's elected
representatives in Congress and the White House seek to honor the
values that, in their best judgment, the Constitution enshrines.
From this perspective, the President and Senate, in considering
a nominee's likely votes on constitutional issues, would be remiss in
gauging a nominee's desirability based on how closely the nominee's
likely votes conform to what most people would like to see. Instead,
the President and Senate would be expected to focus on how closely
those likely votes conform to what, in their best judgment, the
Constitution has to say on the matters in question. Whatever the
precise contours of a Senator's or President's obligation to reflect
on constitutional meaning may be, the endeavor in which he or she
' Among other things, a great deal of what Senators ask and say in confirmation
hearings plainly presupposes a contrary approach. See generally Ross, supra note 21
(discussing the kinds of questions that Senators typically ask). Broad adherence to
the type of approach that Carter assumes to be prevalent is also belied by the way in
which Senators ordinarily discuss the appointment process when they write about it.
See, e.g., PAUL SIMON, ADVICE AND CONSENT: CLARENCE THOMAS, ROBERT BORK AND
THE INTRIGUING HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT'S NOMINATION BATTLES (1992);
Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., Advice and Consent: The Role of the United States Senate in
the Judicial Selection Process, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 200 (1987).
69 I draw heavily in this paragraph on Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's
Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585, 587-89 (1975).
71 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... .") (emphasis added).
7' U.S. CONST. art. VI, cI. 3.
MIRED IN THE CONFIRMATION MESS
should be engaged is radically different from the one envisioned by
Carter when Carter discusses consideration of nominees' likely
votes.
72
In short, whether he realizes it or not, Carter predicates his
judicial independence objection to presidential and senatorial
consideration of nominees' likely votes on the assumption that such
consideration means seeking nominees who will vote in a way that
mirrors the majority's wishes, however heedless of constitutional
values such wishes may be. The validity of this assumption is highly
questionable, and Carter's judicial independence objection is
unpersuasive as a result.
2. "Blood on the Floor" Revisited
Carter's argument against considering nominees' likely votes
because it leads to so much "blood on the floor" is no more
persuasive. Basically, in and of itself, presidential and senatorial
consideration of nominees' likely votes does not lead to the fighting
over appointments that Carter is so eager to avoid. It only leads to
such fighting when combined with presidential domination of the
appointment process-a domination that, as discussed above,
7
3
warrants elimination and that Carter essentially ignores.
The history of the Bork nomination illustrates the point. Carter
repeatedly criticizes the often vehement and sometimes distorted
attacks made on Robert Bork when Bork was nominated to the
Court. "I do not share all of Bork's constitutional vision," Carter
writes, "[but at] the same time, I do believe, quite strongly, in
accuracy, fairness, and simple decency." 4 If only it were as simple
as that! Carter's perspective on the Bork nomination is much like
that of the basketball referee who turns around too late to see a
punch thrown and then ejects the player who hits back.
By any measure, President Reagan's nomination of Bork was a
solid right to the jaw of the liberals and even centrists in the Senate.
Whether or not Bork was "outside the mainstream"-a charge that
was leveled against Bork and that Carter takes pains to dispute75-
Bork was on record as questioning the validity of a host of major
Supreme Court precedents that many Senators held dear.
76
' Cf. Brest, supra note 69 (discussing the nature of a legislator's obligation to
interpret the Constitution in deciding whether to support proposed legislation).
" See supra part II.B.
74 P. 126.
'5 Pp. 127-33.
76 For an enumeration and discussion of Bork's various prenomination statements
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Moreover, he seemed likely in both the short and long run to
exercise an unusually large influence on the outcome of important
cases. The seat that he would fill-Justice Powell's-was one that in
recent years had provided the decisive fifth vote in an array of
important cases; and whoever filled the seat appeared likely to
determine the fate of Roe v. Wade,77 as well as the direction of the
Court in other areas such as affirmative action and separation of
church and state.71 In addition, as Bruce Ackerman once observed
about Bork, "[i]n contrast to the normal nominee, here was a man
whose public record suggested that he might possess both the
transformative vision and legal ability needed to spearhead a radical
judicial break with the past.
" 79
In nominating someone so apt to stir up controversy and so
lacking in broad-based support, Reagan banked on Presidents'
extraordinary ability in this century to make their Supreme Court
nominations stick. In fighting back with sharp attacks that did not
always portray Bork and his record in the fairest light, the opposi-
tion similarly assumed that unless Bork could be made to seem
genuinely dangerous, history left little doubt that the President
would have his way.
If Carter is so distressed about the potential in the current
appointment process for "blood on the floor," he would do far
better to focus his energies on devising means of redressing the
unhealthy imbalance of power in the process, rather than on
attacking the eminently sensible practice of considering likely votes.
If the Senate is made more of an equal partner with the President
in the process, there is every reason to hope that Presidents will not
be as provocative as Reagan was in his nomination of Bork and that
Senators and members of the public will not respond as fiercely as
some did to Bork.
(written and oral) criticizing Supreme Court precedent, see Nomination of [udgel
Robert H. Bork to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciaiy, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, at 6180-6285
(1987) (SenateJudiciary Committee report on the nomination); Stephen Gillers, The
Compelling Case Against Robert H. Bork, 9 CARDoZO L. REV. 33 (1987).
7 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
78See Ronald M. Dworkin, The Bork Nomination, 9 CARDozo L. REV. 101, 102
(1987); Stuart Taylor, Jr., Powell Leaves High Court; Took Key Role on Abortion and on
Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1987, at 1.
7' Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164,1168
(1988).
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C. Carter's Moral Vision Test
The difficulties inherent in Carter's position on consideration
of nominees' likely votes become even more apparent when his
argument that the President and Senate should seriously consider
nominees' "moral vision" 0 is taken into account. Although Carter
maintains that it is wrong to consider how a nominee is apt to vote
on legal issues, he argues that it is essential to inquire into a
nominee's position on issues that were once legal issues but that,
with the emergence of a "broad national consensus" as to their
proper resolution, have undergone a "transformation" into moral
issues.81
Thus, for example, it is right according to Carter to examine a
nominee's position on Brown v. Board of Education8 2 but wrong to
examine his or her position on Roe v. Wade,83 because "there is
broad national consensus on segregation that simply does not exist
on abortion."84 While the validity of Brown has become a moral
question, the validity of Roe remains merely a legal one. In Carter's
view, nominees who do not share the societal consensus bn those
legal issues that have attained moral stature can fairly be labeled
"outside the mainstream" and rejected on that ground.85 Carter
concedes that the "contours of the legal mainstream are unclear,"
but assures us, while citing only Brown, that the concept is not
unmanageable and that there are "a handful of precedents [that] are
clearly and firmly untouchable." 6
I fully sympathize with Carter's desire to rescue Brown from his
broad-based arguments against considering nominees' likely votes.
The legal/legal-turned-moral distinction that he develops, however,
is simply not up to the task. First, if, as Carter maintains, consider-
ing nominees' likely votes is bad because it tends to screen out
independent-minded people who, as judges, would stand up to the
majority will, it is unclear why it is any better to consider likely votes
on his so-called "moral" issues than on "legal" ones. Indeed, it may
well be worse. After all, if what we really want are independent-
minded judges, the last people we ought to be screening out would
80 P. 120.
81 P. 119.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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seem to be ones holding truly distinctive-i.e., "outside the main-
stream-views.
Second, although Carter maintains that his legal/legal-turned-
moral distinction is not unmanageable, there is every reason to
believe that it is. His ability to cite only Brown as an example of a
legal-turned-moral issue hardly inspires confidence in this regard.
Moreover, the "broad national consensus" standard that he appears
to suggest as a criterion for distinguishing legal from legal-turned-
moral issues is amorphous at best.
Lastly, and most basically, even assuming, for purposes of
argument, that Carter provides a reasonably manageable way of
separating legal from legal-turned-moral issues, he fails to show why
inquiring into nominees' views on legal-turned-moral issues is a
materially different endeavor than inquiring into nominees' likely
votes. If, as Carter maintains, the latter type of inquiry is "litmus
testing"8 7 and should be banned, it is not apparent why the former
type does not deserve the same label and fate. Surely the distinc-
tion between the two kinds of inquiries can't be that everyone agrees
on the right answer to legal-turned-moral issues, because if that
were so, there would be no need to ask nominees about such issues
in the first place.
As a final point about Carter's moral vision test, I note that the
distinction that Carter attempts to draw is rather ironic in light of
his frequently expressed aversion to "blood on the floor." In
essence, the only objection to a nominee's views that Carter allows
is that the nominee is "outside the mainstream." As a practical
matter, this means that Senators and members of the public who
oppose a nominee for his or her likely votes can never express their
opposition in moderate terms. Instead, they are forced to make the
more extravagant and often exaggerated claim that the nominee is
outside the mainstream-basically, beyond the pale-thereby causing
a lot more blood to spill.
IV. REASSESSING THE STAKES
According to Carter, one reason why Supreme Court confirma-
tion battles get so nasty is that people tend to exaggerate what is
really at stake. 8 In his view, people would do a lot less fighting
over nominees if they would simply see the Court in proper
87 P. 72.
" See pp. 95, 204-06.
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perspective. They should recognize that the Court has much less
power than the political branches to effect major national change,
and based on this recognition, they should "surrender the bold and
exciting image of the Supreme Court as national policymaker."
8 9
They should "recapture in its stead the more mundane and lawyerly
image of the Supreme Court as-dare I say it?-a court."9 °
Carter briefly recounts the story of how in 1811 two men
nominated by President Madison to fill a Supreme Court vacancy
declined to serve after being confirmed.9 1 The process would be
so much less bloody, Carter suggests, if only people would adopt the
realistic attitude of these two Madison nominees and "learn once
more to treat the role of Justice as simply a job. Not a prize, but a
job-a job not everybody wants." 92
Well, maybe to Carter a seat on the Supreme Court is "simply
a job," but from where I sit, it is one hell of a job, and I have
difficulty understanding why people should believe anything else.
In light of the nature of the issues that come before the Court, the
nationwide effect of the Court's decisions, and the long tenures of
most Justices, seats on the Court seem to deserve all the fuss that
people often make about them. Carter's claim to the contrary may
accurately reflect the Court that he would like to see, but it bears
little relationship to the Court that actually is.
Carter's anecdote about the two Madison nominees is intriguing,
but hardly offers significant support for his view of the Court. On
the contrary, it exemplifies the rather brief-like manner in which he
often uses facts and constructs arguments in the book. First of all,
even if the anecdote might be thought to establish that the Court
was not a very interesting place to be in 1811, that does not tell us
much about the intrinsic worth of a seat on the Court today. A
great deal has happened since 1811 to make the Court more of a
force on the national scene-in particular, the adoption of the post-
Civil War amendments9" and the resulting enormous expansion of
the Court's authority to invalidate state and local laws.
9 4
Furthermore, fully told, the story of the two Madison nominees
does not even support the proposition that the Court was a
9 Pp. 205-06.
go P. 206.
"' See p. 205.
9 Id.
11 See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
94 SeeJOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONsTrrTiONAL LAW 331-50 (4th
ed. 1991) (providing an overview of constitutional protection of individual rights).
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relatively mundane place in 1811. Since Carter relies on Charles
Warren's renowned Supreme Court history in recounting this
story 5 and even refers the reader in his endnotes to Warren's
history for a fuller account,9 6 it seems only appropriate to begin
with Warren's observation that at the time of this vacancy,
the Federal Judiciary had become a live issue in connection with
problems of the day. It was seen that the status and rights of a
United States Bank in Georgia, the rights of land claimants in
Kentucky and Virginia, the regulation of commerce through
embargoes, non-intercourse laws, steamboat monopolies, and
many other questions on which political antagonisms were
arising-all might be brought before the Court for final deci-
sion.
97
The notion that the two nominees viewed a seat on the Court as
"simply a job" is also belied by the nominees' stated reasons for
declining their appointments to the Court. Carter tells the reader
nothing about the nominees' reasons and invites the reader to
assume that they made these decisions because they viewed the
Court as a rather uninteresting place to be. However, Levi Lincoln
offered a very credible explanation of an entirely different sort
when he wrote to Madison, first declining Madison's offer to
nominate him and then refusing the appointment after Madison had
nominated him nonetheless. According to Lincoln, he would have
loved to sit on the Court, but he felt compelled not to accept a seat
because of his advanced years and eyesight so bad that he was
almost blind. 8
By the same token, in refusing his appointment, John Quincy
Adams offered a highly credible explanation also at odds with the
one that Carter implies existed. Adams, who was nominated while
abroad as Minister to Russia, wrote to Madison that he felt obliged
to decline because he was "conscious of too little law" and "too
much of a political partisan."9 Quite clearly, this son of a Presi-
dent had his sights set on the Presidency-an office that he attained
s See p. 205.
o See p. 243 n.16.
9 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 400-01
(rev. ed. 1926).
9 See 1 id. at 409-10 (summarizing Lincoln's letters); see also HENRYJ. ABRAHAM,
JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS 88 (2d ed. 1985) (commenting that "Lincoln, now in effect
facing blindness, felt he had to persist in his decision-much as he would have
relished becoming a thorn in [ChiefJustice] Marshall's side").
" 1 WARREN, supra note 97, at 415 (quoting Adams's letter to Madison).
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in 1825-and was oriented far more to politics than to law."° ' The
fact that he was willing to pass up a seat on the Court in order to
keep working toward securing a seat in the White House makes
clear that he did not regard being ajustice as the equal, at least for
him, of being President. It hardly suggests, however, that he saw a
seat on the Court as "simply a job." Indeed, an individual as
politically astute as Adams could not have helped but recognize
what has become even more apparent today: that, Carter's rather
puzzling claim to the contrary notwithstanding, the Court is an
extremely important and influential place to be.
V. FORGIVENESS
In the abstract, being more forgiving of Supreme Court
nominees' moral lapses may not sound like a bad idea. I suggest
below, however, that at least in Carter's hands, it becomes one. As
Carter would apply it, this idea would pose a serious threat both to
the Court's ability to deliver fair and impartial justice and to public
confidence in the Court. In addition, Carter's reliance on religious
argument to support infusing the process with more forgiveness
gives rise to independent objections based on the proper relation-
ship between church and state. Finally, Carter's tacit assumption
that simply urging Senators and others to be more forgiving of
nominees' lapses is apt to make them so is based upon a view of the
Supreme Court appointment process that is fundamentally incom-
plete.
A. A Telling Illustration
In discussing the need for more forgiveness in the Supreme
Court appointment process, Carter devotes a great deal of attention
to Clarence Thomas and the allegations of sexual harassment
leveled against him by Anita Hill. Carter, who characterizes himself
as "a personal friend [of Hill's] of long standing,"' makes clear
that in his view "Anita Hill told the unvarnished truth and Clarence
Thomas lied when he denied her charges." 0 2 Carter expresses
regret, however, that Thomas did not admit his wrongdoing and try
to convince the Senate and the general public to forgive and forget.
As Carter explains:
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I would genuinely rather live in a world in which a Thomas who
found himself able to say "Yes, it happened, and I am terribly
sorry, but it was a long time ago in a difficult time and I am a
different man" might have found an audience willing to listen.
1 0 3
To put it mildly, I would genuinely rather not. If Thomas had
acknowledged that he did what Anita Hill alleged, I would
hope-apology or no apology-that the nomination would have been
dead then and there.
With the functioning of our nation's highest court and the
public's confidence in that court at stake, some things in a
nominee's past have got to be seen as simply beyond the pale, as
indicative of too much of a risk to reasonably bear. Although there
obviously can be close questions in this regard, it is beyond my
comprehension that the behavior in which Thomas allegedly
engaged might have presented one.
According to Hill, Thomas, over a lengthy period of time,
addressed a host of highly offensive and very degrading sexual
remarks to her while she was in his employ."0 4 Moreover, while
allegedly subjecting Hill to this humiliation, Thomas occupied
positions of public trust-assistant secretary for civil rights in the
Department of Education, and chairman of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission' 5-- in which he reasonably would have
been expected to serve as the paragon of the fair, nondiscriminatory
employer.
If Thomas had admitted that Hill's allegations were true, I
believe that it would have been utterly irresponsible for the
President not to withdraw the nomination and for every Senator not
to make clear his or her intention to vote against confirmation. If
Anita Hill would have had it in her heart to forgive an apologetic
Thomas, more power to her; and I would hope that various people,
including the President and individual Senators, would have reached
out to him on a personal level to offer comfort and moral support.
"s Id.; see also p. 144 ("Had Thomas's supporters (and Thomas himself) been
willing to concede the substance of Hill's charges, and had the concession been
handled in a conciliatory and apologetic way, they might have had the opportunity
to conduct a national seminar on repentance, contrition, and forgiveness.").
' See Nomination ofJudge Clarence Thomas to Be AssociateJustice of the Supreme Court
of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 4, at 36-38 (1991) (testimony on Oct. 11, 1991 of Anita F. Hill); Richard L.
Berke, Thomas Accuser Tells Hearing of Obscene Talk and Advances;Judge Complains of
"Lynching," N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1991, at 1.
105 See Excerpts from News Conference Announcing Court Nominee, N.Y. TIMES,July 2,
1991, at A14 (listing Thomas's prior positions).
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In their capacities as the public's elected representatives charged
with ensuring the quality and integrity of the Court, however, the
President and Senate should have been unwilling to bear the
substantial risk that someone who had engaged in the course of
behavior that Hill described would not display the fair-mindedness,
empathy, balanced judgment, and other habits of mind that are so
important to the proper functioning of the Court. Perhaps even
more obviously, the President and Senate should have been
unwilling to bear the risk that the appointment of someone with this
lurid past would seriously undermine public confidence in the
Court. 0 6
B. Religious Underpinnings
The concept of forgiveness that Carter would introduce into the
appointment process is highly problematic not only in and of itself,
but also because of the type of justification that he offers in its
behalf. According to Carter:
Christian theology teaches that human sin is a consequence of
our freedom-and that the burden of sin is too great for us to lift
alone. In the Christian vision, redemption is possible only
through God. The reason Christian theologians write of guilt as
"threatening" is that the believer always feels the need to justify
himself or herself before God, which is, for the sinful, impossible
to do. But sin is ever-present in human existence, which means
that the fear of God is also ever-present, which is why human
beings are in constant need of God's forgiveness.
One need not be a Christian-or even believe in God-to see
the radical possibilities of this model. If the capacity to do wrong
is ever-present, then we must accept that any one of us (not merely
those nominated for judicial or executive posts) may, at any
moment, fall into sin. If that is so, we surely have a larger
obligation toward the wrongdoer-the sinner-than a simple
condemnation and, in the case of a confirmation fight, a negative
vote. In particular, recognizing our shared sinfulness, we might
instead have the moral obligation to listen for the possibility of
genuine contrition, which might in turn demand of us a degree of
forgiveness.
10 7
"0 For the view that public confidence is particularly vital for the Court, see
Simson, supra note 13, at 627 & n.32.
07 Pp. 183-84.
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Perhaps "[o]ne need not be a Christian" to see the possibilities
of this model, but I seriously question whether one need not be a
Christian to find this appeal to Christian theology at all persuasive.
More basically, I seriously question whether appeals of this sort to
religious doctrine are not undesirable as a highly divisive force. In
a nation with a wide array of religions and many people adhering to
no religion at all, it is reasonable to assume that public debate about
the proper structure of government or the types of laws that
government should make is most productive when not framed in a
way that invites agreement or disagreement based on one's religious
beliefs. The above Christian model may be so appealing to Carter
that he cannot imagine that using it as an argument for more
forgiveness in the appointment process could possibly be divisive
and counterproductive to his cause. For many non-Christians,
however, his invocation of Christian theology cannot help but be
off-putting and serve as a distraction from, and impediment to,
reasoned analysis of the matter at hand.
Although Carter's reliance on religious doctrine is obviously not
an Establishment Clause' violation per se-Carter may be influen-
tial, but he is certainly not the state-a good argument can be made
that he fails to honor the spirit of the Clause. A number of the
Court's Establishment Clause decisions have expressed concern
about the potential for "political divisiveness" from certain laws;
10 9
and as discussed above, some concern about political divisiveness is
also in order here. In addition, Carter's reliance on Christian
doctrine is in tension with the view, held by various scholars
1 0
and implicit to some extent in the Court's case law, that the
Establishment Clause was intended to ensure that laws are adopted
for secular, rather than religious, reasons. The Court has only gone
so far as to hold that a law is invalid if adopted entirely, or almost
'" U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion....").
" See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985); Committee for Pub. Educ.
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 795-98 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-25
(1971); see also Paul A. Freund, PublicAid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680,
1692 (1969) ("While political debate and division is normally a wholesome process for
reaching viable accommodations, political division on religious lines is one of the
principal evils that the first amendment sought to forestall.").
... See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
743 (1992); GaryJ. Simson, The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court: Rethinking
the Court's Approach, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 905 (1987); William Van Alstyne, Trends in
the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly,
1984 DuKE L.J. 770.
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entirely, for nonsecular reasons."' As I have argued elsewhere,
however, the logic behind this holding seems best understood as
requiring the invalidation of any law that would not have been
adopted but for the consideration of one or more nonsecular
purposes."' Under this view of Establishment Clause constraints,
which also draws support from the prevailing Court doctrine on the
constitutional significance of a law's nonsecular effects," s respect
for the principles behind the Clause counsels against the type of
argument that Carter makes for more forgiveness in the appoint-
ment process. If legislators should not be shaping legislation or
governmental processes to conform to the dictates of one or
another religion, then Carter and others should not be pressing
upon them religious reasons to act.
I recognize that the role of religious argument in politics and
lawmaking is a complicated matter on which others, including
Carter in The Culture of Disbelief,"4 have written extensively," 5
and I will not attempt here to spell out fully the details of, and
reasons for, my position. For now, suffice it to say that although
Carter's injection of religion into the appointment-process debate
may be in keeping with his defense of religious argument in The
Culture of Disbelief, it in my view detracts from the appeal of a
proposal about forgiveness that is not very appealing to begin with.
C. Carter's Proposal in Perspective
Perhaps the most significant difficulty with Carter's plea for
more forgiveness in the Supreme Court appointment process is that
it seems essentially beside the point. Like his argument against
considering nominees' likely votes based on the potential for "blood
on the floor,""' it fails to come to grips with the reality of presi-
dential domination of the process and the pervasive effects of that
domination on the entire process.
Viewed in isolation, various Senators' or interested citizens'
emphasis on certain moral lapses in a nominee's past may seem
" See Simson, supra note 110, at 909 & n.24.
1 See id. at 908-11.
11 See id. at 917-23.
'4 STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND
POLrTIcS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993).
"5 See e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE
(1988); MICHAELJ. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER (1991); Ruti Teitel, A Critique of Religion
as Politics in the Public Sphere, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 747 (1993).
16 See supra part III.B.2.
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terribly hard-hearted and unfair. Their approach seems much less
unforgiving and unreasonable, however, when viewed in the context
of a process in which the deck is so heavily stacked in favor of
confirming any nominee whom the President wishes to choose. In
this presidentially dominated process, it is a sad truth, but a truth
noneffieless, that often the only realistic way of trying to defeat a
nominee who one genuinely believes would be a poor appointment
to the Court is to harp on past behavior that might give the public
pause.
In short, I agree that it would be desirable to have a process in
which a nominee's past moral lapses are not seized upon in an
unforgiving way, but rather viewed as fairly and objectively as
possible in terms of what they currently suggest about the nominee's
fitness for the Court. I disagree, however, that simply urging more
forgiveness is a realistic means to this end. Rather than urge more
forgiveness, Carter would do far better to propose structural
reforms that, by redressing the imbalance of power in the process,
would remove the incentive for unforgiving attacks.
VI. SCHOLARSHIP AS RISK TAKING
In one portion of the book," 7 Carter argues that the attacks
on Lani Guinier's scholarship that led to the withdrawal of her
nomination to head the Justice Department's civil rights division"'
were based on an unfair conception of the goals of legal scholar-
ship. He discusses why many of Guinier's published ideas are
controversial and why he finds some unpersuasive. He maintains,
however, that her writings fall well within the time-honored tradi-
tion of scholarship as risk taking and therefore could not be fairly
held against her.
I confess that if I ever find myself in the predicament that Lani
Guinier was in, I hope Stephen Carter won't rush forward to defend
me. I come away from his defense of Guinier somewhat shaken in
my belief that the opposition to her was terribly unfair. For present
purposes, however, my concern is not the unhelpfulness of Carter's
defense of Guinier but the view of scholarship on which it is based.
In short, his view of scholarship strikes me as problematic in a way
that goes to the heart of my criticisms of the book.
11 See pp. 37-44.
.. See Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Abandons His Nomineefor Rights Post Amid Opposition,
N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1993, at Al.
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According to Carter:
Scholarship-the writing that academics do-is part of a conversa-
tion. One puts forth ideas, generates a response, rethinks, and
presses on again. The best scholarship is well informed and fair,
of course, but it is also imaginative and ground-breaking-and it
usually 'takes risks. In the academic world, we insist that risk
taking is what we want to reward. But if scholars with ambitions
to public service (there are probably too many) learn from the
Guinier episode that anything they write, no matter how prelimi-
nary, will later be adjudged a statement of visceral moral commit-
ment, the degree of willingness to take risks will naturally be
less.
19
I would be the last to deny that risk taking is an important part of
the scholarly endeavor. Law, no less than other disciplines, is always
in need of fresh ideas and challenges to established ways of
thinking. I believe, however, that Carter at least implicitly assigns
an importance to risk taking that it should not bear. Particularly
when writing about issues of great and immediate societal signifi-
cance, such as reform of the Supreme Court appointment process,
legal scholars would appear to have more of an obligation than
Carter seems to assume to examine their own ideas critically and to
think through competing arguments with care. Like it or not-and
I don't know of any academics who don't like it-their ideas just
might be taken seriously and put into action, with important
practical effects.
I respect and admire Carter's willingness in this book, as in his
others, 2 ' to speak his mind on controversial themes and to take
positions with which others might strongly disagree. Has he,
however, with this book moved forward the debate on how to




0 See CARTER, Supra note 114; STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991).
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